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Advancing the global health security agenda in light of the 2015 annual
Hajj pilgrimage and other mass gatherings
In the second week of September 2015, health ministers from
across the world converged in Seoul, Korea for the 2nd high level
deliberations on Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). This was
yet another attempt to galvanize a uniﬁed response to infectious
diseases that threaten global health security.1,2 This event
coincided with the arrival in Saudi Arabia of nearly 1.5 million
pilgrims from over 180 countries who will participate in the 2015
annual Hajj pilgrimage.2–5 amidst the ongoing global transmission
of three viral infections associated with high morbidity and
mortality rates with epidemic potential, the Ebola virus (EBOV),
Middle East respiratory Syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) and
avian inﬂuenza virus A (H5N1).6–8 The detection in July 2015 of
Ebola virus from dead body swab of a 17 year old boy in Liberia
after the declaration of Liberia being Ebola Free in May 2015, and
the detection of Ebola virus in the dead body of an elderly woman
in Sierra Leone as the country awaits countdown to being declared
Ebola free, indicate current knowledge gaps of the natural history
and pathogenesis.
The recent large outbreak of MERS-CoV in hospitals in Seoul,
Korea and subsequent spillover to China was unprecedented as the
largest outbreak outside the Middle East.9 This event illustrated
that unless a high degree of awareness and vigilance with effective
surveillance and infection control measures are in place, transmis-
Figure 1. World health Assembly 67 side event ‘‘launch of the lancet series on Mass
Gathering Medicine’’ May 21, 2014, showing from the left to right: Prof. Ziad
Memish, Dr. Richard Horton, Dr. Ala Alwan, HE Eng. Adel M. Fakeih, Dr. Margaret
Chan, HE Remigiusz A. Henczel, Dr. Brian McCloskey.
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return of an infected pilgrim. These are all complex challenges that
detection of even one case can overwhelm any health systems and
adversely affect the economic security of affected countries.
Although the comprehensive Hajj Health Care and Emergency
Management system of Saudi Arabia is well positioned to cope
with known types of threats and related case management10, they
are unlikely to detect any incubating transmissions that occurred
among pilgrims that remain asymptomatic during the pilgrims
stay in KSA.
Although current GHSA is yet to speciﬁcally highlight mass
gathering preparedness as a strategic priority even in countries
with high participant contribution to mass gatherings, the
12 Global Health Security Agenda action packages and the
strategies to minimize the implications of mass gathering on
public health are similar. The risk of infectious disease transmis-
sion during a mass gathering is the same or even more as the risk of
transmission that prevails in any one of the home or host countries
of mass gathering participants. During the world health Assembly
67, a side event took place to launch the lancet series on Mass
Gathering Medicine in May 21, 2014 (Figure 1). Mass-gatheringshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2015.10.003
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).are held for various purposes including religious rituals, sports
activities, or festivals and therefore the demographics, risks, and
the intensity of activities vary. Further, the risks are exacerbated
during mass gatherings such as the Hajj for airborne, droplet, and
body ﬂuid-related transmission due to the absence of social
distancing among participants; increased susceptibility due to
stress, lack of sleep, and changing nutritional factors during peak
events; disruption of medications among persons with chronic
debilitating diseases; and participation in some of the rituals such
as animal sacriﬁces or the practice of scalp hair shaving practices
by self-help groups using unsterile blades rather than in regulated
barber shops. Given that two-thirds of the emerging diseases are
zoonotic, human-animal interaction during some mass gatherings
such as the Hajj further increases the risk, and Saudi Arabia imports
sacriﬁce animals from 6 countries. Thus, except for vaccine
preventable diseases, perfection of disease control strategies in one
or few countries alone including in the host country may not offer
blanket protection from all types of disease transmission dynamics
for epidemic prone disease agents present in any one of the
countries. The impact of these challenges on public health duringious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
Editorial / International Journal of Infectious Diseases 40 (2015) 133–134134mass gatherings can be minimized by two strategies. First, each of
the countries that participate in a mass gathering should have alert
systems in place to identify diseases of transmission-potential
during a mass gathering, control measures in place to avoid the
exportation of such risks, and reduce the participation of
individuals at risk increased risk for disease acquisition. For
GHSA1, this relates to adequate syndromic- and agent-based
surveillance, laboratory enhancements, and reporting systems and
risk communication managed by adequately trained workforce
including one epidemiologist for a population of 200,000.
Furthermore, countries participating in mass gatherings should
have public emergency preparedness in response mode and
adequate surge capacity to be able to respond to potential
emergencies from participants returning from mass gatherings.
Existence of a public health emergency operations center with
sufﬁcient pool of response manpower and medical counter-
measures available will be critical. This can only be functional if
relevant a national public health preparedness policies and
authorities are in place to coordinate a response with diverse
organizational entities such as the ministries of aviation, defense,
interior, and health.
Of note, moving from challenges to disease detection oppor-
tunities, it is worth noting that mass gatherings provide an
unexploited opportunity as an one-stop surveillance venue to
monitor emerging disease threats or existing threats of signiﬁ-
cance in multiple countries. Health examinations and specimen
collection is routine for Hajj pilgrims prior to departure in their
home countries and arrival airports in Saudi Arabia conduct health
screenings. Additional surveillance programs using rapid detection
tests can be implemented in home and host countries of mass
gatherings. Furthermore, the Hajj emergency health management
system operates a network of health facilities with electronic data
management systems that can conduct syndromic- and agent-
based surveillance on symptomatic individuals who seek care
(about 500,000 pilgrims on average during each Hajj) (10)–
deliverables that correspond well with the objectives outlined in
the GHSA1.
In summary, it is imperative that opportunities presented by
the GHSA in the ﬁrst round of 17 countries chosen for immediate
implementation by the U.S. Government1, and future beneﬁciary
countries of the GHSA prioritize and program funding and
activities that speciﬁcally address mass gathering preparedness
in addition to sustained routine activities. We now have the
knowledge that the world did not have during the 1957 Hajj and
inﬂuenza transmission. As the search for vaccines and treatment
continue for these novel challenges, ﬁrst and foremost priority for
the global community is to minimize the effects of emerging
threats during mass gatherings would be to activate public health
emergency management capacities before, during and after these
mass gatherings of signiﬁcance. Mass gatherings offer opportu-
nities to implement, test, and assess GHSA objectives in its entirety
and can contribute signiﬁcantly to health security of individuals,
nations, and the world.References
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